By utilizing the extreme dependence structure and the conditional probability of joint failure (CPJF) between banks, this paper characterizes a risk-stability index (RSI) that quanti…es (i ) common distress of banks, (ii ) distress between speci…c banks, and (iii ) distress to a portfolio related to a speci…c bank. The results show that …nancial stability is a continuum; that the Korean and U.S. banking systems seem more prone to systemic risk; and that Asian banks experience the most persistence of distress. Furthermore, a panel VAR indicates that "leaning against the wind" reduces the instability of a …nancial system. JEL Classi…cation: C10, E44, F15, F36, F37
Introduction
shows the total value of the world's …nancial assets (including bank deposits, government and private debt securities, and equity securities), which stood at $195 trillion at the end of 2007, according to the McKinsey Global Institute (2009) . This $195 trillion is the total amount of capital intermediated through the world's banks and capital markets, and made available by them to households, business, and governments. Moreover, as the lower panel of Figure 1 shows, banks have been the most important …nancial intermediaries since 1990, on average intermediating 33% of global …nancial assets, while capital markets have intermediated 26% of total global assets over the same period, on average. Therefore, given that banks are directly connected (I address this point below) and are among the most important …nancial intermediaries in an economy, on For example, the asset side of a bank's balance sheet contains common exposures in the interbank deposit market. Therefore, large losses due to exogenous causes, like a large company breaking an agreement to pay back a syndicated loan, leads to a succession of events instantaneously distressing a substantial fraction of the banking sector. Moreover, since banks perform related activities, they are also ultimately coupled due to their common exposition to similar macro-risk drivers like the short-term interest rate and "cross-market rebalancing" e¤ects. This means that the asset side of a banks'balance sheet clings to the same risk factors albeit in di¤erent proportions, where the pressure to diversify risk is the underlying motive for risk-sharing rather than risk-concentration. Paradoxically, while diversi…cation reduces the frequency of individual bank failures (i.e. smaller shocks can be easily borne by the system), it makes the banking system prone to systemic breakdowns in case of very large (non-macro) shocks.
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On the other hand, the liability-side of balance sheets is even more alike than the asset side, since the liability side largely consists of bank deposits. Accordingly, short-term interest rate movements encourage substitution between asset categories; and therefore, can quickly change the size of deposits held by the public. Diamond and Dybvig (1983) point out that a vital role of banks is to o¤er deposits that are more liquid than the assets under management. The main reason banks create liquid deposits, when compared to the assets they hold, is for insurance purposes; that is, they force depositors to share the risk of liquidating early, even if it is at a loss.
The Diamond and Dybvig (1983) model shows that o¤ering these demand deposits gives way to "bank runs" if too many depositors withdraw; and for this reason, the values of bank portfolios co-move (either through contagion following an idiosyncratic shock, or owing to a macroeconomic shock such as tighter monetary policy). To solve the problems associated with a bank run, deposit guarantee funds have been installed, and …nancial authorities have committed considerable e¤ort to monitoring and regulating the banking industry, where in recent times there has been a trend towards focusing on the macro-prudential perspective of banking regulation (see Aspachs et al., 2007; Goodhart et al., 2005 Goodhart et al., , 2006 Lehar, 2005) . However, there remain important questions to be answered regarding the stability of any …nancial system. As the current crisis has highlighted, regulators and academics do not fully understand how risk is distributed within a …nancial system, and there is "insu¢ cient" knowledge about the e¤ects and desirability of regulatory measures.
If we were able to know the risk exposure of di¤erent risk factors, then we would be able to better assess the impact of adverse shocks to a system; however, we do not yet have an accepted quanti…cation or time-series for measuring …nancial stability. Despite this shortcoming, what is most frequently employed as an alternative is an "after the fact" assessment of whether a crisis has occurred. This dichotomous measure is then used to gauge whether common risk factors preceded, perhaps even causing, such crises, and then to evaluate which o¢ cial responses have best mitigated the crisis in question. However, such an approach is fraught with shortcomings.
Speci…cally, the de…ciency of having a continuous scale makes it unfeasible to calculate (i) the relative riskiness of a system in non-crisis periods, and/or (ii) the strength of a crisis once it occurs, with any accuracy. If the former could be quanti…ed, it may allow for early corrective action as the menace of a systemic crisis increases. On the other hand, quanti…cation of the latter can smooth the progress of decision making relative to the most suitable course of action to …ght the crisis. As Segoviano and Goodhart (2009) state "a precondition for improving the analysis and management of …nancial (banking) stability is to be able to construct a metric for it".
Segoviano and Goodhart (2009) do construct a metric for …nancial stability, which they call the PAO ("probability that at least one bank becomes distressed"). However, the PAO only re ‡ects the probability of having at least one extra distress, without specifying the size of the systemic impact. The …nancial stability perspective taken herein is that multiple risk factors "fail" due to a common risk exposure (see de Bandt and Hartmann, 2000; Allen et al., 2009 for comprehensive surveys on systemic risk modeling).
The well-being of the banking sector, as designated by the balance sheet items, is (arguably) re ‡ected in credit default swap spreads, since CDS's are a type of insurance against credit risk.
2 However, it is worth pointing out that there are those who argue against the reliability of CDS 2 A CDS is similar to a put option written on a corporate bond, and like a put option, the buyer is protected from losses incurred by a decline in the value of the bond stemming from a "credit event". Accordingly, the CDS spread can be viewed as a premium on the put option, where payment of the premium is spread over the term of the contract. More speci…cally, CDS spreads are considered as determinants of default risk as well as liquidity risk (Das and Hanouma, 2006; Hull et al., 2004) . Moreover, a long stream of research, starting with Merton (1974) , has established a strong link between credit risk markets and equity markets. Europe spreads as a trustworthy indicator of a …rms'…nancial health. The main criticism being that CDS spreads may overstate a …rm's "fundamental"risk when: (i) the CDS market is illiquid, and (ii) when the …nancial system is frothing with risk aversion. Even though these types of arguments might be accurate, they can become self-ful…lling factors if they have a real e¤ect on the eagerness of the market to …nance a particular …rm (Segoviano and Goodhart, 2009 ). Consequently, this can lead to a real deterioration of a …rm's …nancial health, as we have experienced throughout the 2007-2010 …nancial crisis. Additionally, even though CDS spreads may overshoot, they do not generally stay wide of the mark for long, where the direction of the move is by and large a good distress signal (see Figure 2) . Accordingly, the aim herein is to take advantage of the aforementioned properties of the banking sector in order to epitomize the likelihood for systemic risk, especially during an eco-nomic downturn. Moreover, this paper endeavors at going further than the conventional "shocktransmission" approach, which is the epicenter of many existing frameworks. As an alternative, the focus herein is on spotting and dealing with the build-up of weaknesses preceding downward corrections in markets, problems with institutions, or failures in …nancial infrastructure. The conjecture inherent in this approach is that the shocks that may ultimately cause such adjustments are (usually) considered less relevant when viewed in isolation, and therefore, are often overlooked.
This also accords with the view that …nancial stability is a continuum (Houben et al., 2004) , in which "imbalances" may develop and then either fritter away or build up to the point of moving any …nancial system away from stability.
The starting point in this approach is the stylized fact that the return series of …nancial assets are fat-tailed distributed; therefore, the commonly maintained assumption that returns are normally distributed leads to an underestimation of risk. Hence, given the focus on extreme co-movements of risk, I will allow for fat-tails to capture the univariate risk properties. For the multivariate analysis, the normal distribution based correlation concept is also of limited value, since regular dependence and tail dependence are independent (see Garita and Zhou, 2009 ).
For these and the above-mentioned reasons, the research herein will calculate the conditional probability of joint failure (CPJF) and a risk-stability index (RSI) derived from multivariate extreme value theory (mEVT ), which quanti…es systemic risk in a …nancial system. This index is based on forward-looking price information stemming from credit default swap (CDS) spreads, which are easily available in real time and on a daily basis; moreover, it is also economically instinctive, since it is comparable to a notional premium (i.e. to a risk-weighted deposit insurance plan that protects against harsh losses in the banking system). This new index also has the property that it increases when the conditional probability of joint failure and the dependence structure increase. In other words, higher systemic risk (i.e. an increase in the riskstability index) re ‡ects an elevated sensitivity by market participants regarding higher failure risk, as well as their view that the conditional probability of joint failure is higher. In addition, the risk-stability index reveals the importance of di¤erent risk factors (e.g. banks) in causing systemic risk, where the potential for a systemic breakdown of the …nancial system can be either weak or strong (see de Vries, 2005) , depending on whether the "conditional probability of joint failure" fades away or remains asymptotically (see Garita and Zhou, 2009) . Accordingly, the international monetary and …nancial system can be described as being relatively stable in the former case, while in the latter case it is more fragile.
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By applying a multivariate extreme value theory (mEVT ) methodology to a portfolio composed of 30 banks from around the world, I show that extreme dependence, whether it be relationship-speci…c or system-wide, varies from period to period, thereby lending support to the idea that …nancial stability is a continuum. The CPJF-based results indicate that banks are highly interlinked especially within geographical borders; corroborating Hartmann et al. (2007) , who argued that in a more integrated banking system (e.g. the U.S. or Korea) area-wide systemic risk is higher, and that the lower overall spillover risk in Europe is due to the weak extreme crossborder linkages. The results also show that Asian banks seem to experience the most persistence of distress, followed by U.S. banks, which are in turn followed by European banks. The results stemming from the risk-stability index show that, on average, Asian banks create slightly more instability to the …nancial system, followed by U.S., and then by European banks. The panel-data VAR indicates that the RSI is negatively and signi…cantly associated with the federal funds rate and the term-spread (de…ned as the di¤erence between the 10 year and 3 month treasury constant maturity rate); this suggests that monetary policy can help reduce instability in a …nancial system.
The remainder of the paper evolves as follows: Section 2 will discuss the measures of dependence employed herein. Section 3 provides empirical results for the CPJF, while section 4 provides the results for the risk-stability index. Section 5 looks at the directionality of contagion and the persistence of distress. Section 6 takes advantage of the time-series properties of the Risk-Stability Index, and estimates a panel VAR. Lastly, section 7 concludes.
Measures of Dependence
In order to understand the dependence between two normally distributed random variables, it is su¢ cient to know the mean, variance and correlation coe¢ cient. However, the correlation coe¢ -cient is not a useful statistic for …nancial data for various reasons. First, economists are interested in the risk-return trade-o¤ for which the correlation measure is only an intermediate step; that is, the correlation coe¢ cient measures dependence during normal times, and it is largely dominated by the moderate observations rather than the extreme observations. Boyer et al. (1997) show that even if the normal distribution is applicable, verifying "the market speak" of increased-correlations during crisis times, can be illusory at best. To make the point more precise, Forbes and Rigobon (2002) show that even after adjusting for heteroskedastic biases (i.e. increases in variance), "there was virtually no increase in unconditional correlation coe¢ cients" during times of crisis. Second, the de…nition of the correlation coe¢ cient depends on the assumption of …nite variance; however, the distribution of …nancial data (e.g. asset returns) is not multivariate normally distributed, that is, the tails of the return distributions are "fat". Thirdly, the multivariate normal-based correlation does not measure very well the extreme dependence of …nancial data; therefore, what is required is a multivariate measure for the tail dependence (for a formal analysis of univariate EVT, see Embrechts et al., 1997) .
Multivariate EVT: tail dependence
Multivariate EVT (mEVT ) takes into account more than the tail behavior of each individual risk factor, since it also looks at the extreme co-movements among them. Moreover, this approach makes it possible to …nd (possible) contagion e¤ects stemming from "distress" in one risk factor in relation to other risk factors in a system. As an example of a two-dimensional case, assume a system of two banks, with loss returns X and Y . Following de Haan and Ferreira (2006) , the two-dimensional EVT assumes that there exists a G(x; y) such that
we can express the marginal tail indices as follows:
by using these marginal tail indices, we can remove the marginal information by simply changing
, which allows us to write (1) as follows:
Through (3) we can notice that the marginal information, which is summarized by the tail indices 1 ; 2 , has no in ‡uence on L(x; y). In other words, the two-dimensional EVT condition models the marginals through one-dimensional EVT and it models the tail dependence through the L(x; y) function. As noted by de Haan and Ferreira (2006) , 1 L(1; 1) 2. A value for L(1; 1) equal to 1 indicates complete tail dependence. If L(1; 1) equals 2, then it indicates tail independence. In the case there is an interest in looking at a multidimensional setting (e.g. the e¤ects of one bank's failure on the rest of the …nancial system), as is the case in this paper, then equation (3) can be modi…ed accordingly. Let X = (X 1 ; :::; X d ) denote the losses of d individual risk factors, where each risk factor X i follows a univariate EVT setup with its own tail index i and scale function a i (t). Therefore, for any x 1 ; x 2 ; :::; x d > 0, as ! 0, we have:
However, this time around the values will be delimited between 1 and the number of risk factors d; the estimation procedure follows Huang (1992).
Risk-Stability Index (RSI)
Building on the mEVT framework previously discussed, I construct a risk-stability index based on Garita and Zhou (2009) and Zhou (2009) . This index makes it possible to quantify the e¤ect that a "failure" of any risk factor can have on an entire …nancial system, be it economy-wide or worldwide. Another way of looking at the index is as an estimation of the number of risk factors that would "fail", given that a speci…c risk factor "fails" (i.e. which risk factor failure will have the most adverse e¤ect on a …nancial system). For expositional purposes on the construction of the RSI, assume that the …nancial system consists of three banks. From equation (4) we know that
For bank X i , the RSI is de…ned as:
E(number of crises in X 2 and X 3 j X 1 is in crisis)
Denote = 1fX i > V aR i ( )g as X i being in crisis, for i = 1; 2; 3. Using this to rewrite (5), we obtain:
Note that the above expression can be rewritten as the sum of two expectations as follows:
Rewriting (7) in terms of probabilities, and by using equation 13 (see Appendix A) we get:
By using equation (4) in the above expression, it is easy to show that:
or in the three-bank example:
An RSI close to d 1 means that risk-factor i has a high in ‡uence on the …nancial system, while an RSI close to 0 implies a negligible in ‡uence of risk-factor i on the …nancial system.
Data
Choosing the data is more often than not a subjective approach, since one has to choose between having a maximum number of risk-factors, and having a maximum amount of (time) observations. The analysis to follow is based on 30 major banks (11 Asian banks, 12 European banks, 6 U.S.
banks, and 1 Canadian bank), for which the decision to include these banks was made on the amount of observations. Accordingly, the daily CDS spreads (all at 5-year maturity in USD) range from February 1, 2002 until July 22, 2010, and are obtained from Markit. In order to show the evolution of "(in)stability", a 500-day sub-sample moving (weekly) window is used to construct a time-series for both the CPJF and the Risk-Stability Index.
Conditional Probability of Joint Failure
Before proceeding with the analysis, it is imperative to calculate the number of high-ordered statistics k, by using an estimator for L(1; 1) and plotting the results of L(1; 1) for di¤erent k and for all the bilateral relationships. This is the same technique as for choosing the tail-index with a Hill-plot, in which we have a trade-o¤ between "too small" or "too large" k. If k is "too small", then we choose too few observations and the variance of the estimator is large. If on the other hand, k is "too large", then we are incorporating "non-extreme" observations (i.e. observations from the middle of the distribution), and therefore we would impose a bias to our estimator. The solution to this trade-o¤ is to make a "Hill-plot" (see Hill, 1975) , and to let the tail speak for itself. The solution to this trade-o¤ for each bilateral relationship yields a k = 45, which implies
As is well known, assessing the exact point in time when "liquidity risk" turns to "solvency risk", is di¢ cult at best, and disentangling these risks is a complex issue. Additionally, note that more often than not, CDS not only cover the event of default of an underlying asset, but they also cover a wider set of "credit events" (e.g. downgrades). I consider the combined e¤ects of these factors, which are inherent in CDS spreads, to encapsulate "distress" or "failure" risk (i.e.
large losses and the possible default of a speci…c bank). 5 I measure systemic risk in a bivariate setting through the conditional probability of joint failure (see Appendix and Garita and Zhou 2009 ). The CPJF always lies between 0 and 1. If it is zero, then the probability of joint failure is negligible; however, if it is one, then the "failure" of a risk factor in a portfolio will always go hand in hand with the downfall of the other risk factor. An important point to keep in mind before proceeding, is that conditional probabilities do not necessarily imply causation (I will deal with causation and directionality in section 5); however, this set of bilateral conditional probabilities of joint failure do provide important insights into the interlinkages and the likelihood of contagion between banks in a portfolio (i.e. in a …nancial system).
Common Distress in "Local" Banking Systems
The results found in this subsection indicate that banks within a geographical area are highly interlinked, with distress in one bank clearly associated with a high conditional probability of joint failure elsewhere in the "local" system. Moreover, the degree of extreme dependence varies from period to period as illustrated by Figures 3 and 4 , which present the detailed bilateral interconnections between 7 major South Korean banks ( Figure 3 ) and between 6 major U.S.
banks (Figure 4 ). Morgan Stanley
Global (in)Dependence -Distress Between Speci…c Banks
In the previous section we saw that bilateral stress of "local" banks can be quite high. However, when comparing across regional borders, is one banking system more at risk than another? What do my indicators say about the relative size of bank contagion risk when comparing economic areas (e.g. the euro area and the United States). Therefore, in order to gain insight into cross-border e¤ects, the CPJF's are now calculated between the 6 U.S. banks, the 12 European banks, and the 1991, leading to a collapse of the subprime mortgage industry, to a surge in foreclosure activity, and rising interest rates that threatened to depress prices further as problems in the subprime market spread to the near-prime and prime mortgage markets. Intriguingly, a relatively calm period followed, which seems to be related to the perception of market participants that "things cannot get any worse"; after all, it was during the summer of 2007 that the Dow Jones Industrial Jan04 Jan06 Jan08 Jan10 Jan04 Jan06 Jan08 Jan10 Jan04 Jan06 Jan08 Jan10 Jan04 Jan06 Jan08 Jan10 Table 1 , which gives the average conditional probability of joint failure between banks within and across borders, highlights four main points: (1) "risks" vary by geographical region; (2) within border bilateral distress is higher than across borders on average, with Korea's banking system being more highly interconnected, followed by the US banking system; (3) regional cross-border contagion is also relatively high, but not as high as within borders; and (4) global contagion is present and clearly an issue. These results, which corroborate the results by Hartmann et al. (2007) , indicate that in much more integrated banking systems (e.g. Korea and the United States), economy-wide systemic risk is higher, as banking business is much more interconnected. In other words, the lower spillover risk in Europe is explained by the quite weak extreme cross-border linkages. Moreover, the results also indicate that …nancial stability must be managed inside-out (within borders …rst), but that international coordination is extremely important. 
Distress to Financial System Linked to a Speci…c Bank
As explained in section 2:4, the risk-stability index makes it possible to quantify the (contemporaneous) e¤ect that a "failure" of any risk factor can have on an entire …nancial system, be it economy-wide or worldwide. In simple terms, the risk-stability index gives an estimation of the number of risk-factors that would "catch a cold", given that a speci…c risk-factor "sneezes", by allowing us to pin-point which risk factor failure will most adversely a¤ect a …nancial system. A risk-stability index (equation 9) close to d 1 means that risk-factor i has a high in ‡uence on the …nancial system, while an RSI close to 0 implies a negligible e¤ect of risk-factor i on a portfolio (or any …nancial system); therefore, the higher the index, the higher the instability of a portfolio or system. Morgan Stanley
An immediate result that stands out is the similarity between the RSI and the CPJF graphs.
Clearly, the CPJF's and the RSI move in tandem, indicating that as bilateral distress starts to build-up, so does the risk to the …nancial system (but also, as the …nancial system starts to experience increased levels of distress, so do the bilateral relationships). The results also show that, on average, banks tend to a¤ect about 10 other banks, on average, with Asian banks having an infection rate of 33% (Korean banks a¤ect 35% of banks, on average). Asian banks are followed by European and U.S. banks, with an infection rate of 29% each. However, looking at averages masks the fact that risk varies from period to period, but also that …nancial instability can arise from anywhere, irrespective of geographical location. European banks (see Figure 10) . Intriguingly, the bottom panel of Figure 10 shows that at the time of its demise, Lehman Brothers was not creating any more instability than any other U.S.
bank; it was actually creating slightly less instability than Citi, Goldman Sachs, and JPMorgan.
Directionality and Persistence of Distress
Another aspect of particular interest regarding …nancial stability is the directionality and the persistence of distress. Accordingly, this section aims at uncovering the aforementioned issues by employing, for tractability purposes, 8 periods of 500 days (with a one-year overlap). The results of this particular exercise are presented through Figure 11 , which shows how the directionality of contagion to the …nancial system has evolved through time. 8 In other words, the …gure shows how many banks will "fail", given that bank "i" "failed" one period before. Figure 11 : Directionality of Contagion -the …gure shows the consequences to the banking system conditional on bank i "failing" one period before (see footnote 8 for period coding). For example, 1 2 (on the x-axis) shows the repercussion to the system in period 2, given that bank i "fails" in period 1. For example, in section 3 we uncovered that, during the latter parts of 2007 and early 2008, UBS was one of the banks with elevated levels of bilateral distress (with an average CPJF of 53%). Figure 11 indicates that in 2008 at least 10 other banks su¤ered distress due to the fact that UBS experienced distress on period before. Figure 11 also shows that the failure of Lehman Brothers did not lead to any major instability of the system, since less than 5 banks su¤ered due to Lehman Brothers collapsing one period before. Clearly, banks a¤ect a system with a lag; however, what is most interesting, is that they do so at irregular intervals implying that the system is constantly under stress, where the source of the stress varies from period to period. Figure 12 : Persistence of Distress -the …gure shows the consequences to bank i, given that it "failed" one period before (see footnote 8 for period coding). For example, 1 2 (on the x-axis) shows the repercussion to bank i in period 2, given that if "failed" in period 1. As previously mentioned, another aspect of particular interest regarding …nancial stability is the persistence of distress for bank i in the portfolio; where persistence is quanti…ed by the diagonal of the distress dependence matrices (available upon request), displayed here as Figure   12 . This …gure indicates that the Japanese bank Mizuho tends to experience the most distress persistence (average CP JF = 78%), followed by Lehman Brothers (average CP JF = 36%) from the USA, and then by Woori (average CP JF = 32%), Shinhan (average CP JF = 30%),
and Kookmin (average CP JF = 28%), all from South Korea. At the lower end of persistence are the Swiss banks CreditSuisse (average CP JF = 4%) and UBS (average CP JF = 5%),
followed by ING(average CP JF = 5%), Unicredito (average CP JF = 5%), and JPMorgan (average CP JF = 6%). In conjunction, the DDM's and Figure 12 also show that within regions, Asian banks tend to experience the most persistence of distress, on average, with a 22% conditional probability of joint failure at time t, given that the same Asian bank experienced distress at t 1 (South Korean banks experience a 25% CPJF). Asian banks are followed by U.S. banks with a 16% CPJF, and then by European banks with an 10% CPJF, on average.
Across regions, Table 2 indicates that Korean banks are the most contagious, with an average CPJF of 20:3%. They are followed by U.S. banks (average CP JF = 17%), and then by European banks (average CP JF = 12%). On the other hand, the biggest generator of contagious bilateral distress for Asian banks are U.S. banks, with a CPJF of 18%. The abovementioned results indicate that in a much more integrated banking system, such as the one in Korea and the United States, economy-wide systemic risk is higher, as banking business is much more interconnected. In other words, the lower spillover risk in Europe is explained by the quite weak extreme cross-border linkages (see Hartmann et al., 2007) . 
VAR Analysis
This section implements a panel-data vector autoregression methodology (see Holtz-Eakin et al., 1988; Love and Ziccino, 2006) in order to uncover the feedback e¤ect from the banking system to the rest of the economy. This procedure merges the traditional VAR and panel-data methodologies, by allowing for endogeneity and for unobserved individual heterogeneity. However, when applying the VAR approach to panel data, it is crucial that the underlying structure be the same for each cross-sectional unit (Love and Ziccino, 2006) . Since this constraint is likely to be violated in practice, one way to overcome the restriction is to allow for "individual heterogeneity"; that is by introducing …xed e¤ects in the levels of the variables. However, due to the lags of the dependent variables, the …xed e¤ects are correlated with the regressors; therefore, the usual approach of "mean di¤erencing"would create biased coe¢ cients. Therefore, in order to avoid this problem, the panel VAR methodology uses forward mean-di¤erencing, also known as the "Helmert procedure" (see Arrellano and Bover, 1995; Love and Ziccino, 2006) . This transformation preserves the orthogonality between the transformed variables and the lagged regressors; thereby allowing the use of the lagged regressors as instruments and the estimation of the coe¢ cients through a system GMM.
The impulse-response functions describe the reaction of one variable to the innovations in another variable in the system, while holding all other shocks equal to zero. However, since the actual variance-covariance matrix of the errors is unlikely to be diagonal, it is necessary to decompose the residuals in such a way that they become orthogonal, in order to isolate shocks to one of the variables in the system. The usual convention is to adopt a particular ordering and allocate any correlation between the residuals of any two elements to the variable that comes …rst in the ordering. 9 The identifying assumption is that the variables that come earlier in the ordering a¤ect the following variables contemporaneously, as well as with a lag, while the variables that come later a¤ect the previous variables only with a lag. In other words, the variables that appear earlier in the system are more exogenous, and the ones that appear later are more endogenous. Finally, to analyze the impulse-response functions we need an estimate of their con…dence intervals. Since the matrix of impulse-response functions is constructed from the estimated VAR coe¢ cients, their standard errors need to be taken into account. Accordingly, the standard errors of the impulse response functions and the con…dence intervals are generated through Monte Carlo simulations.
The panel VAR employs the RSI time-series (see Figures 9-10) , and the following …nancial market variables (from FRED and CBOE): the short rate (e¤ective federal funds rate), the term spread (di¤. between 10-year and 3-month Treasury constant maturity rates), the market return (returns on the S&P 500), and the VIX, which is the implied market volatility. The number of lags in the panel VAR system equals 2, and is selected through the Schwarz Bayesian Information
Criteria.
The reaction of the macroeconomy and the market to banking system shocks are as follows (see column 1 in Figure 13 ): an increase of the risk-stability index lowers the federal funds rate, while increasing the slope of the term structure. This result suggests that monetary policy reacts to …nancial instability concerns. The results of the panel VAR also indicate that a higher conditional probability of joint failure, and an increased sensitivity of market participants to higher failure risk deteriorates the general market, by lowering the returns to the S&P 500. Last but not least, the perception of market participants that the VIX is the "fear index" is corroborated by the results, since a positive shock to the risk-stability index increases the implied volatility of the market.
As is well known, the VAR framework allows for a feedback e¤ect (see row 4 in Figure 13) from the macro-economy and the general …nancial market to the banking system. This feedback e¤ect shows that an increase in the federal funds rate (used as a proxy for the global interest rate) reduces the risk-stability index. This indicates that "leaning against the wind" decreases the instability of the …nancial (banking) system. Moreover, the results also indicate that an improvement in the returns to the S&P 500, as well as a reduction of the VIX (i.e. of market volatility), reduces the sensitivity of market participants to failure risk.
The variance decomposition (Table 3) con…rms the above-mentioned results. More speci…cally, the RSI explains about 5:5% if interest rate movements, especially at longer horizons (30 weeks).
However, the RSI only has marginal explanatory power of the returns to the S&P 500 and the VIX. On the other hand, the returns to the S&P 500 explain more of the risk-stability index variation than any other variable (especially at longer time horizons), followed by the VIX. Figure 13 : Impulse-Responses of a one standard deviation shock for 2-lag Panel VAR (errors are 5% on each side generated by Monte Carlo with 1000 replications). RSI = risk-stability index; FFR = e¤ective federal funds fate; T.Spread = di¤erence between 10 year and 3 month treasury constant maturity Rate; SP500 ret = returns on the SP500; VIX = implied volatility of the market. T. Spread = Di¤. between 10 year and 3 month treasury constant maturity rate; VIX = implied volatility of the market.
Conclusion
It is a stylized fact in international (…nance) macroeconomics that most …nancial data are "fattailed"; meaning that extreme co-movements tend to arise more regularly than predicted on the basis of the normal distribution. Accordingly, this paper has highlighted an easy methodology for computing systemic risk caused by risk factors in a portfolio or system; moreover, this methodology can be easily applied to any risk factor or asset return. This novel approach takes advantage of a multivariate extreme value setup and the concomitant extreme dependence structure to construct the conditional probability of joint failure (CPJF) and a risk-stability index (RSI), which are in turn applied to 30 Asian, European, and U.S. banks. The risk-stability index (RSI) o¤ers good insight into (1) the sensitivity of market participants in relation to higher failure risk, since it is higher when the conditional probability of joint failure is higher or when the exposure to common risk factors increases; and (2) on the level of a risk-based deposit indemnity plan that safeguards against severe losses in a portfolio or …nancial (banking) system.
The results obtained in this paper show that extreme dependence varies from period to period, thus supporting the idea that …nancial stability is a continuum. The bilateral CPJF-based results indicate that banks are highly interlinked especially within geographical borders. These results also show that, on average, Korean banks have a propensity to create and experience higher systemic risk for themselves, followed by U.S. banks, and then by European banks. These last set of results corroborate Hartmann et al. (2007) , who argued that in a more integrated banking system (e.g. the United States or Korea) area-wide systemic risk is higher, and that the lower overall spillover risk in Europe is due to the weak extreme cross-border linkages. The persistence of distress is also an important variable that must be taken into account when analyzing …nancial stability; accordingly, the results show that Asian banks (mainly South Korean banks) seem to experience the most persistence of distress, followed by U.S. banks, which are in turn followed by European banks.
Interestingly, the risk-stability index does not corroborate the idea that the "failure" of Lehman Brothers caused any additional distress to the …nancial system. However, the results highlighted in this paper clearly indicate that the decision of central banks from around the world not to let any other …nancial institution "fail" was the right decision, since "domino-e¤ects" appear to be long-lived, and severe; thereby impacting not only domestic markets, but also …nancial systems from around the world. Another aspect that has been much talked about by economists and regulators is that regulation must be aimed at institutions that are "too big to fail". However, while not directly tested, the results herein indicate that "too big to fail" does not seem to be a major factor in explaining instability of a …nancial system. What does seem to be of more importance is whether …nancial institutions are "too interconnected to fail"; but this is something that future research will have to uncover.
The panel-data vector autoregression results indicate that the risk-stability index is negatively and signi…cantly associated with the federal funds rate and the term-spread (de…ned as the difference between the 10 year and 3 month treasury constant maturity rate). This suggests that when monetary policy is "accommodative", most banks move together more closely. By contrast, when monetary policy is tightened, banks can be a¤ected di¤erently, depending on their liquidity positions. The VAR results also show that the risk-stability index and the returns to the S&P 500 are negatively and signi…cantly correlated. This result is intuitive, since the deterioration of the general market (i.e. lower market returns) increases the sensitivity of market participants vis-à-vis higher failure risk, as well as their view that the conditional probability of joint failure is higher.
As is well known, the VAR framework allows for a feedback e¤ect from the banking system to the macro-economy and the general …nancial market. This feedback e¤ect shows that an increase in the risk-stability index negatively a¤ects interest rates and the returns to the S&P 500. Interestingly, the former result suggests that interest rate policy may be a¤ected by …nancial stability concerns in practice. As a …nal point, the positive correlation between the risk-stability index and the VIX index is well-matched with market participants'perception that VIX is the "fear index".
The macro-prudential view, which elicits explicit supervision of "asset prices" and the stability of the …nancial system, has by now gained wide acceptance among economists. Nonetheless, implementing macro-prudential regulation depends, largely, on the operational feasibility. Despite this "obstacle", the research herein o¤ers a good foundation and a useful starting point towards understanding the rapport between …nancial (in)stability, monetary policy, and the real economy.
The results herein indicate that the monitoring of …nancial stability within and between economies should be a counter-cyclical continuous process; and that this analysis must be wide-ranging, probing all risk-factors that in ‡uence the …nancial system. Furthermore, it should be intended at the early detection of …nancial vulnerabilities, which can arise (from) anywhere and at any time, as this paper has underscored.
A1 -Conditional Probability of Joint Failure Garita and Zhou (2009) de…ne the "conditional probability of joint failure" (CPJF), which is a special measure of two-dimensional tail dependence, as follows: given that at least one risk-factor "fails", the CPJF is de…ned as the conditional probability that the other risk-factor will also "fail". Let X = (X 1 ; X 2 ; :::; X d ) represent the losses of d number of individual risk factors, then, the corresponding V aR (value at risk) at probability level of any two variables are V aR i ( ) and V aR j ( ). We then de…ne:
CP JF i;j = lim !0 P (X i > V aR i ( ) and X j > V aR j ( )jX i > V aR i ( ) or X j > V aR j ( ))
which can be rewritten as
where
P (X i > V aR i ( )) + P (X j > V aR j ( )) 1 P (X i V aR i ( ); X j V aR j ( ))
is the dependence measure introduced by Embrechts et al. (2000) , and …rst applied by Hartman et al. (2004) . Under the mEVT framework, the limit in (10) and (12) exists (see de Haan and Ferreira, 2006, Ch. 7) . A higher CPJF between two risk-factors indicates that a "failure" of these two institutions is more likely to occur at the same time; moreover, the CPJFs may vary, which highlights the di¤erent linkages during crisis periods. In the two-dimensional case, the CPJF can be written as CP JF = lim !0 P (X 1 and X 2 ) P (X 1 or X 2 ) = lim !0 P (X 1 ) + P (X 2 ) P (X 1 or X 2 ) P (X 1 or X 2 ) = lim 
